Changing Values in Criminal Law—Comments on Professor Hall\u27s Paper by Bugelski, B. R.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 2 Article 3 
1-1-1967 
Changing Values in Criminal Law—Comments on Professor Hall's 
Paper 
B. R. Bugelski 
University at Buffalo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
B. R. Bugelski, Changing Values in Criminal Law—Comments on Professor Hall's Paper, 16 Buff. L. Rev. 
360 (1967). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol16/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
CHANGING VALUES IN CRIMINAL LAW-COMMENTS ON
PROFESSOR HALL'S PAPER
B. R. BUGELSXI*
D R. Hall is concerned over the erosion of criminal law because of the develop-
ment of views and practices in society on behalf of defendants that
editors sometimes describe in the statement "make everyone guilty except the
criminal." He wants to preserve the law which he perceives as a time honored
value of a rational society from further erosion. He does admit some irrational
elements in the law, but finds it basically a logical product of centuries of
thought and experience. He sees eroding operations on many sides and men-
tions, among others, the adjustments the law has made for the insane (tem-
porary or otherwise), the alcoholic, the mistaken, the coerced, the tired, confused,
and the young. There are also the common practices of probation, suspended
sentence, waivers of felony charges, "the copping of pleas," paroles, etc.
I am not so sure that the law described by Professor Hall as "the precise
definition of criminal conduct, prescription of the maximum sentence, and,
of course, the ban on retroactivity,"' is a value of our culture. The current
values of society seem to have changed into a concern over civil rights, including
those of criminals, rather than a concern over guilt and punishment. Alleged
criminals are frequently discharged by the courts because of the illegal manner
in which the evidence against them was "obtained, and not because of a finding
of innocence. There has also come into the picture a disillusionment over the
role of punishment. We no longer seek revenge, yet prisons are not really
expected to reform felons. The law is perhaps more correctly seen as an ex-
pression of the culture, a set of protective devices for the dominant segment of
society and frequently for the benefit of certain individuals in the culture who
manage to get laws enacted for their own benefit, while they violate sanctions
developed to protect the interests of others. Some of the pillars of our society
cheat on their income tax returns. The law is a reflection of current interpreta-
tions of the nature of man. It changes as the views of society about the nature
of man change. The law is not an unchanging reality in itself, although we
might agree that the "principle of law" might be. How the principle is imple-
mented would vary from time to time, and with different segments of society.
In any event, the law is not a sufficiently serious value for those who violate it,
and it is with these violators, the criminals, that we are concerned.
Dr. Hall indicated that he was not inclined to endorse a deterministic
principle in his approach to criminology. This is unpleasant, ignoble, and
incongruous to him, and he would prefer people to be rational and somehow
* Professor of Psychology; Chairman, Dep't of Psychology, State University of New
York at Buffalo.
1. Hall, Psychiatric Criminology: Is it a Valid Marriage? The Legal View, supra
p. 350.
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look for better solutions than their pasts would predict. I rather doubt that
anyone is really capable of finding a better solution to his problems than his
history provides, even though we may not be at the stage of development of
behavioral science to make these predictions for the problem solver. I also
doubt that the question of determinism can be resolved here, and am glad to
by-pass it in favor of some other comments. We should note, however, that
strong social pressures, including those arising from Freudian views, are currently
active to relieve everyone of responsibility. Today the criminal is generally
viewed as someone who could not help himself, a victim of unconscious forces,
faulty rearing, the bad environment, the broken home, the working mother, etc.
But let us forget "unconscious forces" and accept the fact that a criminal,
say a purse-snatcher, "knows" what he is doing, namely, snatching purses. The
law (i.e., courts, juries, prosecutors) also wants him to recognize (appreciate,
know) that this is wrong. He may well know that it is illegal-that is, that some
other people have passed laws saying that purse-snatching is bad, evil, sinful,
etc.-but it is obvious that the purse-snatcher does not agree. For him it may
be "dangerous" but it is not necessarily wrong. It may even be right and good,
especially if the purse is fat. What I am describing is a case of dissocial re-
action or of a sociopath, a member of a class psychiatrists once called psycho-
paths. Such individuals are "outlaws" and live in their own culture, with their
own rules and laws; they are enemies of the dominant culture which passed the
rules that are in conflict with their own. Our national crime syndicates have
their own legal system.
How does the law treat the sociopath? Does it consider the rationality of
the behavior from the criminal's viewpoint? If he is young and from a slum,
or a drug addict, there may be some talk of "another chance," "faulty environ-
ment," need for reform, rehabilitation (note the absurdity of rehabilitating
someone who has never been habilitated). Too great a concern over the
rationality of the criminal might require social reforms that are not too attractive
for the defenders of the status quo. If the criminal is old, a member of a crime
syndicate, a two- or three-time loser, he is jailed when caught and the law
closes its weary eyes to his rationality. The law does not want to hear Valachi's
logical reasons. The rational law, the law of sensible men (that is, the law-
makers), then does not apply to sociopaths-they know what they are doing,
they know that it is considered wrong by someone else (they make every effort
to conceal their crimes or escape capture), but they do not consider their
behavior at all irrational or wrong. Nor are they driven by forces any more
unconscious than those that drive the lawmakers. For the purse-snatcher the
logical thing to do when you need money is to snatch a purse. Criminal law
presupposes that the criminal agrees to the wrongfulness of an act, whereas
he obviously does not. He does not "know better" and, according to a rationally
based law, he should not be punished. He should be taught to really appreciate
the values of a society to which he does not really belong. Punitive sanctions
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
are not appropriate. They are used to get rid of a problem. Sociopathic criminals
are not punished so much as "caged." Punishment is not expected to change
them. They are locked up and given television sets. Valachi has onel
Besides the sociopaths we have the neurotics and psychotics. Some psychotics
are brain-damaged, or otherwise physically diseased, and their crimes are clearly
excusable. Others have lost touch with reality (not in the interpretation of
Dr. Hall-some of their intellectual functions might be quite adequate); the
textbook paranoid can plan an involved scheme to destroy a family or a church
congregation-he just doesn't realize his own nature or status. If he thinks he
is an avenging angel he is out of touch with reality even though his IQ is 150.
He too will be excused; this time by psychiatrists. In fact, the more people he
murders the more likely he is to escape legal sanctions. Even the public will
say "only an insane monster could perform such foul deeds." Dr. Hall assumes
that the capacity to think rationally and effectively is somehow "integrated"
with the rest of an individual's personality or behavior. This does not mean, as
Dr. Hall apparently takes it, that an intelligent person cannot be psychotic.
There is probably normal range of intelligence in state hospitals for the insane.
They may be psychotic but not necessarily ignorant. Such integration as exists
could incorporate anti-social motives, as well as noble ones.
The neurotics provide the most difficult cases. The psychiatrists try to
show how they are victims of their anxieties and defenses. It is frequently said
that they are "sick," although some maverick psychiatrists like Szasz call this
sickness a myth. Here the law has its greatest problems. You should not
punish the sick, even if their sickness is not such as responds to pills, or can
be described in terms of fevers, chills, rashes, and aches or pains. Dr. Szasz
argues that they must be treated as criminals if they break laws. Psychiatrists
should not attempt to plead their cases lest the dispensation of justice fall into
the hands of psychiatrists and not of lawyers. Recently a local judge indicated
that he would like a psychiatric judgment before a trial. The psychiatrists
would then determine if a trial was in order. This is complete capitulation of
the judicial function to what even the practitioners admit is a shaky science.
But Professor Mowrer,2 a psychologist of Illinois, argues paradoxically
that neurotics are really criminals, sinners, doers of wrongs, who need punish-
ment as therapy. To free them in courts of justice is to condemn them to an
unrelieved pursuit of their neurotic patterns. According to Mowrer, the only
cure for neurotics is confession, restitution, and punishment. The neurotic is
the only appropriate person to bring before the bench. He has some conscience,
i.e., recognition of the dominant mores (not enough to keep him from a crime
or crimes, but enough so that he is disturbed when he violates the ethical-moral-
legal code of the dominant culture of which he is a somewhat unintegrated
member). Because he has some conscience he suffers in neurotic malaise. He
cannot help what he did-the irresistible impulse is a correct enough label for
2. Mowrer, The New Group Therapy (1964).
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any crime committed (if it is committed it certainly wasn't resisted). Yet, for
his own good, he should not be excused. He should be tried and punished accord-
ing to a law he grudgingly respects. No paroles, suspended sentences, or reduc-
tions of pleas; these will not help him, but only perpetuate his condition.
We come then to the conclusion if we go along with Mowrer, that the law
is required to treat neurotics. Normal people, by definition, do not commit
crimes. Professor Hall stated: "given normal intelligence, there will be normal
control of conduct."3 The law-making public wants protection against crime,
yet psychotics and sociopaths are not to be punished by a rational legal system,
they must be cured or reformed or reeducated, except that we do not have the
facilities, manpower, or skills to do the job. The only criminals for whom the
rational law is needed are irrational neurotics. They know right from wrong,
but could not help what they did; yet, even so, they need trials, convictions,
and punishment, not to satisfy the law, but to cure their neuroses. The law
must be maintained for the good of neurotics, not because it is a rational value
to man.
3. Hall, supra note 1, at 356.
